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Re: [Public WebGL] Proposed change to WebGL spec section 4.2 (Security Origin Restrictions)

----- Original Message -----

> My argument as to them being orthogonal is that the canvas spec having
> something similar would not affect WebGL. Imagine that Vlad's
> suggestion were implemented in the canvas spec today, would that
> somehow make it such that readPixels and tainted images could be used
> in the same WebGL context? I don't see how. So the WebGL spec would
> have to be changed in the exact same way whether or not it is adopted
> for 2d canvas.

Note that when I (and I believe) Chris says "at the Canvas level", it doesn't mean at the canvas 2D context level -- but actually at the core level of the <canvas> element, regardless of the underlying contexts.  Canvas doesn't really have much language to say there, but I think the spec could be extended to define what it considers origin clean/origin dirty in a more fine grained way.  I wouldn't want to add very detailed descriptions of that into the WebGL spec, especially at this point; doing the tracking of the various pieces is certainly possible, but it's not code that I would want to write right now for 1.0.

So, if the canvas (element) spec were to be extended to describe origin-clean resources and take into account CORS, etc., I don't see any reason why a WebGL implementation couldn't start following the tighter definitions in the future.

    - Vlad
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